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According to current estimates, the Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) of halving the 1.1 billion people without access to safe
drinking water by 2015 will only be achieved by 2040, especially in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Why will it take this long? Because tariffs
are unaffordable and investments in infrastructure are extremely low.
The privatisation of water services has not helped reverse these
trends. In many developing countries, privatisation has resulted in
“spectacular failures”, according to the UNDP’s Human Development
Report 2006. The failures spring from the absence of competitive
market structures, ineffective regulation, and weak capacity to
enforce and negotiate contracts.
The corporatisation of public companies and the commercialisation
of water services are now common. These measures are often
seen as intermediate steps towards “cost recovery” before full
privatisation. An improvement in the performance of public
utilities is welcome. But the current reforms are problematic in
their excessive reliance on tariff rationalisation and their neglect
of investment needs. The commercialisation of urban water
services in Zambia is a good example.
Until the 1990s, Zambia’s central government was responsible
for the delivery of urban water services, except in the Copperbelt.
Water tariffs were subsidised. Because of economic decline in the
1970s and 1980s, however, the government could not sustain
the necessary investments and maintenance. The commercialisation
of water started in the early 1990s, and by 2006 there were 10
commercial water companies in Zambia’s urban centres.
Commercialisation led to tariff increases of up to seven-fold in
real terms. Can the poor afford water tariffs in Zambia? The ratio
of household spending on water to household income is the
yardstick commonly used to assess affordability. The 5 per cent
and 3 per cent benchmarks are often used. Our estimates indicate
that, by both measures, low-cost water is unaffordable for about
40–60 per cent of urban dwellers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt,
where most of the urban population lives. Using the 5 per cent
benchmark, moreover, we found that water is unaffordable for
all urban households in extreme and moderate poverty, except
for those in the Southern Region.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the proportion of the population
with access to safe water declined from 72 per cent in 1992 to 57
per cent in 2002. The quality of access has also deteriorated: about
25 per cent of users lost their piped supply and became dependent
on public taps, wells, boreholes, rivers, ponds and lakes (Table 1).
Because levels of access to water are low, utilities have to raise tariffs
even higher to recover costs. Average cost recovery, however, was
only 67 per cent. One reason is low revenue collection: 25 per cent of
the billed amounts are never collected. The other is the high level
of “unaccounted for water rate”, which is the difference between the
volume of water produced and the amount billed. This rate averaged
about 50 per cent throughout the commercialisation period, largely
because of poor infrastructure, lack of maintenance and wastage.
Are market-based solutions the answer to a lack of investment? The
evidence indicates that investment did not increase after liberalisation.
Not only has the government underinvested in the sector, but it has
also failed to maintain its plans for capital expenditure. Total capital
expenditure, including donor funds, has remained a minor fraction
of the spending needed to maintain existing rates of access to
water (Table 2).
The policy dilemma is how to fund capital investment without high
tariffs restricting access. So far, Zambia’s liberalisation strategy has
emphasised tariff rationalisation. This has failed to ensure full cost
recovery and has further constrained affordability and accessibility.
The correct policy prescription is up-front public investment to renew
and extend infrastructure. This approach would reduce unit costs in
the sector, make tariffs affordable and improve the sustainability of
cost-recovery efforts. Otherwise, Zambia is unlikely to meet the MDG
on water for a very long time.
Further Reading:
Dagdeviren, Hulya (2008). “Waiting for Miracles: The Commercialisation of Urban Water Services
in Zambia”, Development and Change 39(1): 101–121.
Table 1
The Population’s Access to Water in Zambia (% of population)
1992 2002
  Total national access 72 57
  Total urban access 93 90
Piped into residence 55 42
Public taps 34 38
Wells and boreholes 9 16
Rivers, ponds, lakes etc. 2 4
Table 2
Investment in the Water and Sanitation Sector, 1998–2002
1998 3.1 2.4
1999 2.4 2.9
2000 3.0 1.8
2001 12.3 2.0
2002 8.8 2.2
Actual government capital
expenditure as a percentage
of budgeted capital expenditure
Actual expenditure*
as a percentage of required
capital expenditure to maintain
existing access rates
* Including donor funds in the sector.
